(Mainichi Japan) October 20, 2011
Journalists' responsibilities heavy in face of unprecedented crisis (Part 1)
新聞週間特集：「原発事故と報道」報告（その１） 被災者の視点重く
＜新聞週間代表標語 上を向く 力をくれた 記事がある＞
The unprecedented disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, in which fuel meltdowns were found to have taken place simultaneously at three reactors, poses a massive challenge to the media.
３基の原子炉が同時期に炉心溶融するという世界でも例のない東京電力福島第１原発事故は、報道する側にも重い課題を突きつけた。
Looking back, did we promptly deliver accurate information that could save the lives of the public?
国民の命を守るため、事実を正確に迅速に伝えられたか。
Reflecting upon our experiences gathering information from the disaster areas, as well as from the Prime Minister's Office, plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and other groups and individuals, what can we say about our coverage of the ongoing crisis?
被災地や官邸、東京電力、経済産業省原子力安全・保安院などで悩みながら取材した記者の体験を通して、原発と報道について考えた。（肩書はすべて当時、紙面イメージは東京本社朝刊最終版）
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◇「どう裏付け、どう伝える」迷い 東電・保安院、二転三転
Press conferences were held intermittently by TEPCO and NISA beginning March 11, when the nuclear disaster was triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami.
事故発生日の３月１１日から東京電力と経済産業省原子力安全・保安院で断続的に開かれる会見を取材した。
As the safeguards meant to guarantee the safety of the nuclear power plant failed one after another, it was our task as reporters to discern the state of the plant with the limited information we had, motivated by a sense of impending danger to residents living in close proximity to the power plant.
原発の安全を守るはずの機能が次々と失われていく中、限られた情報で、何とか原発の状態を見極めようとした。
周辺住民の命に関わるとの危機感があったからだ。
At the mercy of backtracking government and TEPCO officials, however, we were often at a loss as to how to confirm the legitimacy of the information we were given and how the information should be relayed to the public.
だが、二転三転する情報に振り回され、どう裏付けを取り、どう伝えるべきか迷うことも多かった。
A little after 3:30 p.m. on March 12, images of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant appeared on the screen of a television at TEPCO's head office in Tokyo's Uchisaiwaicho district.
１２日午後３時半過ぎ、東京・内幸町の東電本店のテレビに、福島第１原発が映っていた。
It appeared as though just the steel frame of the upper part of the No. 1 reactor building remained.
１号機の原子炉建屋の上部は鉄骨しか残っていないように見えた。
The reporters grew alarmed. "Something's not right," one said.
「何か変だ」。集まっていた記者が騒ぎ出した。
However, even after seeing the footage, TEPCO's public relations officer stubbornly insisted: "We don't know what's going on.
しかし、東電の広報担当者は映像を見ても「分かりません。
We're trying to confirm with those on the scene."
現地に確認します」の一点張りだった。
Finally, at a press conference held four hours later, TEPCO admitted that there had been a hydrogen explosion at the plant's No. 1 reactor.
ようやく４時間後に開かれた会見で、水素爆発と認めた。
By that afternoon, radioactive cesium and iodine were detected in the power plant's surrounding areas.
午後には原発周辺で放射性セシウムやヨウ素が検出された。
Koichiro Nakamura, then deputy director-general of NISA and the press officer for the agency, explained that it was possible that a reactor meltdown had taken place.
広報担当だった保安院の中村幸一郎審議官は１号機について「炉心溶融の可能性がある」と説明した。
Soon thereafter, Nakamura stopped appearing in press conferences.
その直後に中村氏は会見から姿を消した。
The new press officer refused to offer any further information, sticking to the line: "We can't discuss anything until the Prime Minister's Office has made an announcement."
新たな広報担当は、「官邸が発表した後でないと話せない」と口が堅くなった。
Subsequently, NISA avoided using the phrase "core meltdown," replacing it with either "fuel damage" or "core damage."
保安院はその後、深刻な事態を物語る「炉心溶融」という言葉を避け、「燃料破損」や「炉心損傷」という言葉を頻繁に使った。
However, several months later, it emerged that NISA had previously asked power companies to fake support for nuclear power at a symposium, and on Aug. 10, approximately five months after the onset of the nuclear crisis, then NISA director Nobuaki Terasaka announced: "We recognized the possibility of a core meltdown soon after the incident began."
ところが、保安院による原発シンポジウムのやらせ問題の発覚などを受け、事故発生から約５カ月後の８月１０日に会見に応じた寺坂信昭保安院長は「炉心溶融の可能性を事故直後に認識していた」と発言した。
On March 12, NISA designated the Fukushima disaster a level 4 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), but a month later upgraded it to level 7, the worst level on the scale, which had until then been given only to Chernobyl.
保安院は３月１２日に国際評価尺度（ＩＮＥＳ）で事故をレベル４と発表したが、１カ月後にはチェルノブイリ事故と並ぶ最悪のレベル７に切り替えた。
An understated announcement would be made, followed later by a revision.
事態を過小に見積もった後、訂正する。
Statements concerning the nuclear disaster simply repeated this pattern.
事故にまつわる発表はその繰り返しだった。
So did TEPCO and the government respond appropriately to the crisis?
事故以降、東電や政府の事故対応は適切だったのか。
I cannot shake the feeling that the damage could have been reined in far more than it has been.
もっと被害を防ぐ方法があったのではないかという疑問をずっと持ち続けている。
And slowly, through the efforts of the "Investigation Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company" set up by the government, it's become clear what prevented officials from being more effective.
最近、少しずつだが分かり始めた。カギの一つは政府が設置した事故調査・検証委員会にあった。
In preparation for a midterm report to be submitted by the end of the year, the committee has been conducting interviews with TEPCO and government officials.
東京科学環境部 調査・検証委は年内の中間報告に向け、東電や政府関係者のヒアリングを続けている。
These interviews have revealed that it occurred to neither NISA nor to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to use a computer system called the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), in coming up with an evacuation plan.
その中で明らかになったのは、放射性物質の拡散を予測する「緊急時迅速放射能影響予測システム」（ＳＰＥＥＤＩ）について、保安院をはじめ、文部科学省などに予測結果を避難に役立てようという発想がなかったということだった。
Furthermore, no one in NISA had even recognized the necessity of contacting neighboring countries, let alone raising the issue, before low-level radioactive water was dumped into the Pacific Ocean on April 4.
また、４月４日に低濃度の汚染水を海に放出する際、近隣諸国に事前通報をせず、批判を招いたが、保安院の担当者の中には、事前通報の必要性を認識し、指摘した人すらいなかったことも分かった。
What I've gathered from my experiences trying to understand the disaster is that both TEPCO and the government have failed to look at the crisis from the point of view of the victims.
事故の背景を探るこうした独自取材を重ねて感じたのは、東電や政府には被害を受ける側の視点が足りなかったということだ。
Norio Kanno, the mayor of the Fukushima Prefecture village of Iitate, lamented that he did not receive any information from the central government for a month or two after the nuclear disaster began, and suggested that it was because "hearts (of government officials) lacked concern for the disaster areas."
福島県飯舘村の菅野典雄村長は、「事故から１、２カ月は政府から情報が届かなかった」と憤ったが、その理由を「心が被災地に向いていないからではないか」と話していた。
There is anger directed toward media, too, which we as journalists must accept and learn from.
怒りの矛先は我々マスメディアにも向けられている。率直に受け止めたいと思う。
The basic mission of newspapers is to collect information in the field and deliver it accurately to the public.
新聞の基本は現場取材を重ね、確実な情報を伝えることだ。
At the beginning of the nuclear crisis, however, we had no idea whether the information we had to work off of was accurate.
だが、事故発生時は基となる情報が正しいかどうかがわからないうえ、
In addition, many experts were divided on what they believed.
専門家の評価も分かれた。
Requests for permission to go on-site to the power plant to report were denied by TEPCO.
東電には福島第１原発の現地取材を申し入れているが、「対応が難しい」と断られている。
When reporters haven't looked at the scene themselves, how are they to communicate the very limited information that they do have?
記者が現場を見ていない中、限られた情報をどのように伝えたらいいかと迷いは尽きない。
Settling of the ongoing crisis, including decontamination beyond the plant's borders, is expected to take many years.
除染も含めた事故収束には、まだ長い年月がかかるとみられる。
The investigation into the disaster's cause has just begun.
事故原因の調査も始まったばかりだ。
The responsibility to stand on the side of those who receive the news, and write articles that will contribute to reconstruction and to shed light on the cause of the disaster weighs squarely on our shoulders.
情報を受け取る側の立場に立って、復興や事故原因の解明に役立つ記事を書く。その重みをかみしめている。
(By Junko Adachi, Science and Environment News Department)
＜東京科学環境部・足立旬子＞
(This is part one of a six-part series on coverage of the Fukushima nuclear crisis.)
毎日新聞 2011年10月18日 東京朝刊
